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COMMENTS
The Problem of Consumer Bankruptcy: Is Amendment
of the Bankruptcy Act the Answer?
The question of whether the current frequency of consumer
bankruptcy1 is a necessary function of consumer credit remains unanswered.2 The burgeoning number of consumer bankruptcies in
a period of unparalleled national prosperity suggests fundamental
weaknesses in the credit-oriented economy. Bankruptcy filings, now
numbering nearly 172,000 annually, have trebled over the past
decade. 3 For twelve consecutive years the number of petitions filed
has exceeded that of the prior year. 4 Nonbusiness bankruptcies, most
of which offer no assets for distribution, constitute ninety per cent
of all filings. 5
The cost of frequent bankruptcy is substantial, measured both
by lost business profits and by the expense of maintaining the bankruptcy system. In fiscal 1963, when more than ninety-nine per cent
of all bankruptcy petitions were voluntary, 6 1.68 billion dollars in
creditor claims were discharged by distributions to creditors of
51.23 million dollars, an average return of barely three cents per
I. "Consumer bankruptcy" refers to bankruptcy of employees and others not in
business. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1964, at 4, n.2 (1965) (hereinafter cited as
1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES].
2. 'While some consumer failures are a normal result of consumer credit, their
multiplication over the past decade has at least paralleled and perhaps exceeded the
rate at which consumer credit has been extended. While one's conclusion depends
upon the base year selected, in fiscal 1959 there was one consumer bankruptcy per
579,494 dollars consumer credit; in fiscal 1961, one per 438,935 dollars and in fiscal
1963, one per 502,187 dollars. Compare 49 FED. REsERvE BULL. 64 (1963) with ADMINIS·
TRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR END·
ING JUNE 30, 1963, at 5 (1964).
Professor Frank R. Kennedy, addressing the 24th Annual Conference of Federal
Judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, April 19, 1963, noted that in comparing the total
outstanding consumer credit and the total number of bankruptcy filings by nonbusin~
debtors for the years 1945 and 1962, "the ratio of consumer debt to consumer bankruptcy was identical•••• I should like to suggest seriously that one of the prices of
consumer credit is a statistically predictable percentage of bad debts."
3. 1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES, table F-2. During the same period straight bankruptcy
proceedings quadrupled, exceeding the annual records set in 1932 and 1935. See Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1452 (1964), for a thorough statistical
analysis of the problem.
4. See 1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES I.
5. 1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES 4. In fiscal 1964, the total 162,367 ordinary bankruptcies
which were terminated included 16,942 nominal asset cases, in which the assets above
exemptions were consumed by administrative expenses and 104,023 no-asset cases, in
which assets in the bankrupts' estates failed to exceed exemptions. 1964 BANKRUPTCY
TABLES 6.
6. 1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES, table F-2. Virtually all involuntary proceedings are
business bankruptcies; 88% of all voluntary proceedings are personal bankruptcies, and
80% are initiated by wage earners.
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dollar.7 The cumulative loss to creditors through l:iankruptcy proceedings represented 1.91 per cent of the total consumer credit outstanding in 1963 of 69.9 billion dollars. 8 The cost of sustaining the
judicial and administrative bankruptcy system exceeded 22 million
dollars in fiscal 1963.9 While administrative fees and expenses in
~sset t:ases have risen to 26.6 per cent of the total proceeds realized,
the average dollar realization per case has decreased to 4,840 dollars. 10
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was designed to deal primarily with
business failures; its draftsmen did not foresee the problems generated by credit-minded consumer debtors.11 The allowance of a
discharge in bankruptcy was meant to encourage business risk-taking
in fields of low or unproved productivity. Realizing that somewhat
different considerations may apply to nonbusiness bankrupts,12 Congress instituted the wage earners' plan in the Chandler Act of 1938.13
Under Chapter XIII, an insolvent debtor may commit himself to
pay out of his future earnings his obligations in whole or in part
pursuant to an extension or composition. 14 It was hoped that the
debtor would prefer the Chapter XIII relief whenever feasible
because it permits him to discharge his debts in a more dignified manner under limited judicial supervision without so greatly risking
loss of employment and possessions. 15 But most wage earners' plans
require from the debtor considerable frugality and determination.
Unfortunately, widespread use of Chapter XIII has not been effected. In fact, fewer than twenty per cent of consumer bankrupts
elect a wage earners' plan. 16
Because wage earners' plans are beneficial to creditors and
debtors, 17 various interest groups have striven to encourage debtors
7. Id., tables F-6, F-9, F-10. The bankrupt is discharged from his obligations in
96% of all straight bankruptcies; 85% of petitioners in asset cases are discharged, and
99% in nominal and no-asset cases. Id., table 4a.
8. 50 FED. REsERVE BULL. 1316 (1964).
9. 1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES, tables F-7, F-8.
10. Id. at 8, 9. The percentage cost of administration, up from 26.4% in fiscal 1963,
has not been exceeded since 1941; the average realization in fiscal 1964 decreased from
the previous year's 5,511 dollars.
11. See Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 19 Bus. LA.w. 271 (1963). See generally Olmstead, Bankruptcy-A Commercial
Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1902).
12. The earliest American bankruptcy statutes extended the absolute discharge
only to traders in the belief that non-traders did not merit relief from their improvident decisions. See 2 Stat. 19, 20-21 (1800).
13. 52 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1958).
14. Bankruptcy Act § 623, 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1958).
15. See Nadler, Relief for the Wage Earner-A New Way To Pay Old Debts, 60
COM. L.J. 33 (1955).
16. See Countryman, supra note 3, at 1461. Stiff repayment policies fostered and
enforced by some courts have not been successful.in combatting consumer bankruptcy
by deterring the hard-pressed wage earners from being "extravagant."
17. See ibid. Since 87% of all straight bankruptcies distribute no assets to any
creditor and the remainder pay off only 8% of their unsecured claims, the prospect of
realizing 95% of all claims under a wage earners' plan is appealing.
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to tum to Chapter XIII. Currently two groups, the National Bankruptcy Conference and the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of the
American Bar Association, are proposing to Congress amendments to
Chapter XIII in the hope of making it more effective and more
widely accepted.

I.

PROPOSALS OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE

The National Bankruptcy Conference18 plays an important role
in the continuing development of the Bankruptcy Act. The Chandler Act of 1938 was adopted by Congress on the Conference's recommendation practically without modification. 19 The 1952 and
1962 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act incorporate basically the
changes proposed by the Conference.20 In 1961 the Conference established a Committee on ·wage Earners' Plans to recommend
amendments to Chapter XIII "as comprehensive as were the Chandler Act amendments with respect to straight bankruptcy."21 The
Committee drafted recommendations which have been approved by
the Conference for introduction into the 89th Congress.22
One significant revision proposed by the Conference is to redesignate the "trustee" in Chapter XIII proceedings a "distributing
agent." 23 The change in terminology is intended to emphasize that
the Chapter XIII trustee is not meant to assume the broad administrative functions of a trustee in straight bankruptcy, but rather to
fulfill only the narrow role of receiving and distributing funds paid
by the debtor pursuant to a wage earner's plan.24 The extralegal
18. The Conference is a voluntary association of lawyers, referees, law teachers, and
others interested in improving bankruptcy law and practice.
19. See Levy, The Chandler Act for Creditors, 43 Coll!. L.J. 464 (1938).
20. See Kennedy, Bankruptcy Legislation of 1962, 4 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL &
COMMERCIAL L. R.Ev. 241, 242 (1963), citing H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1952): S. REP. No. 1954, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
21. Resolution No. 35, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, SUMMARY OF PROCEED·
INGS (1961). The initial problem confronting this Committee was whether to streamline
existing administration of Chapter XIII while retaining the framework of the present
act or to attempt a more extensive revision of the policies underlying Chapter XIII.
The Committee limited its scope to existing bankruptcy law and practice in the belief
that consistency in procedure and fairness in administration would eradicate many
abuses under Chapter XIII and thereby encourage more widespread resort to it by
debtors for relief. See generally NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITrEE ON WAGE EARNERS' PLANS (1963).
22. The approved proposals are set forth in Appendix A.
23. See Appendix A, Bankruptcy Act §§ 633(3), 662.
24. The comprehensive duties Congress delegated to trustees in straight bankruptcy
contrast sharply with the enumerated functions of a Chapter XIII trustee. Compare
Bankruptcy Act § 47, 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1958), with Bankruptcy Act
§ 633(4), 52 Stat. 932 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1033(4) (1958). See Krause, Arrangements and
Wage Earner Plans-Proceedings Under Chapters XI and XIII, 15 VAND. L. REv. 151
(1961). See generally Brown, A Primer on Wage-Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII
of the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Bus. LAw. 682 (1962); Sloan, Wage Earners' Plan, 7 KAN. L.
REv. 175 (1958), urging that the trustee should be authorized to challenge creditors'
claims; to move to dismiss the petition, to increase or decrease installments by calling
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functions performed by some Chapter XIII trustees have occasionally exceeded even the broad range of activities of their section 44
counterpart.25 In some jurisdictions Chapter XIII trusteeships are
well-organized, highly lucrative businesses, and the functionaries
consider themselves to be the central, indispensable force in wage
earner proceedings.26 They frequently provide the debtor with services not authorized by Congress, such as family counselling and
budget planning.27 Unfortunately, the proposals do not deal with
other significant shortcomings of the Chapter XIII trustee. Many
trustees receive a high rate of compensation from fees and commissions which are taken from the wage earner's payments, a practice
which seems inconsistent with the policy of impressing the debtor
with frugality. 28 Perhaps a more serious criticism of the commission
system of payment is that it tends to encourage unnecessary activity
on the part of the trustee. 29 It would seem advisable, therefore, to
place Chapter XIII officials on salary, or at least to limit their annual compensation.30 It has also been alleged that in some areas the
trustee, referee, creditors, and the debtor's employer combine to
pressure the employee into "electing" an extension plan and that
occasionally the debtor is refused a discharge in straight bankruptcy
and must elect the Chapter XIII procedure. 31 Any such coercive
practices should be authoritatively denounced.32
for an examination of the debtor, and to restrict indorsement of the debtor's paycheck;
and to fulfill functions properly within the scope of the duties of the debtor's attorney. Cf. Rice v. Mimms, 291 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1961).
25. One practitioner described his conception of a Chapter XIII trustee as "the
state trooper on the highway of credit, ... [who] must function as attorney, a deterrent
to irresponsible action by debtor and creditor alike, a prosecuting attorney, a probation
officer, a violations clerk, and, in the bargain, an unpaid propagandist, economist, and
philosopher." Meth, The Importance and Responsibility of the Trustee in Chapter
XIII Cases, 17 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 52, 53 (1963). See generally Rice, The
Trustee Under Chapter XIII, 30 REF. J. 102, 103 (1958).
26. See Maulitz, Operations Under Chapter XIII, 27 REF. J. 68 (1953); NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON WAGE EARNERS' PLANS 9 (1963).
27. See Allgood, Operation of Wage Earners' Plan in the Northern District of
Alabama, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 578 (1960); Rice, supra note 25. The desirability of a
debtor's counselling service is now under consideration. See JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF
THE U.S., REPORT OF 1964 PROCEEDINGS 82.
28. See Sloan, supra note 24. One trustee depicts his standing trusteeship as "a
chance to help your fellow man ... and, secondly, ... a very profitable little practice;
•.. for the work involved there, the fees allowed by the Court are rather generous.''
Rice, Practical Application of Wage Earners' Plans, 28 KAN. S.B.A.J. 165, 172 (1959).
29. See Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State1,
33 REF. J. 7 (1959).
30. Address by Frank R. Kennedy, supra note 2. Others fear that well-qualified
trustees could not then be attracted for a sufficient tenure to make such a limitation
practicable.
31. See Allgood, Chapter XIII-Referee Allgood of Alabama Replies to Referee
Walker, 33 REF. J. 51 (1959). Statistical evidence tends to substantiate such allegations.
For example, the Fifth Judicial Circuit and Alabama in particular entertain more
Chapter XIII petitions in proportion to total bankruptcy filings than any other region.
32. See Walker, supra note 29. Debtors should also be permitted freely to file a
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Proposed section 61433 provides for the stay of enforcement of
any lien during execution of the plan.34 However, protection of
the debtor and the unsecured creditors from foreclosure would be
conditioned upon prompt payment to the lienor of the regular installments, thus leaving the value of the security substantially intact.311
Proposed sections 646(2) and 652(1)36 would exclude automatically from an othenvise satisfactory plan any provisions that deal with
a claim of a secured creditor who does not wish to be included in the
plan. The proposal would repudiate In re O'Dell,87 which held that
a bankruptcy court must reject an entire wage earner's plan, even
though acceptable to a majority of unsecured creditors in number
and amount, whenever one secured creditor refused to assent to his
inclusion in it. While under present law the debtor may amend his
plan to omit that creditor,38 this proposal would prevent the secured
creditor's objection from delaying the administration of a plan
othenvise satisfying the requisites for confirmation.39
An amendment to section 60640 would exclude from the proceedings creditors' claims which arise after the debtor filed his wage
earner's petition. This proposal was prompted by a widespread
voluntary Chapter XIII petition regardless of the particular judge's distaste for the
proceedings. Chapter XIII's use is disproportionately low in Wyoming and areas of
Texas. See 1964 BANKRUPTCY TABLES, table F-2.
!13. See Appendix A. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1962 REPORT
66. A bill, S. 3307, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., was introduced to amend the § 606(1) definition
of "claims" to include those secured by real property and chattels real; the National
Bankruptcy Conference disapproved the proposal as tending to complicate planning.
34. In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962), held that, while a mortgagee
of realty could not be required to participate in a wage earner's plan as a method of
paying the outstanding debt, the court retained jurisdiction over all the property of
the debtor, including an equity of redemption in the property of substantial value,
and could issue an injunction prohibiting foreclosure and sale. In Hallenbeck v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963), reversing 209 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Va.
1962), the court held that a referee had discretion to enjoin foreclosure because the
general purpose of Chapter XIII is to rehabilitate the debtor and to relieve him from
harassment.
35. In re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961). See generally Comment, 4 SANTA
CLARA LAw. 72 (1963).
36. See Appendix A.
37. 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961).
38. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMJIUTTEE OF
THE COMMITTEE ON WAGE EARNERS' PLANS 27 (1964), suggests that, for the purposes of
Chapter XIII, a secured creditor ought to be one whose security interest is not voidable
under any provision in Chapters I to VII inclusive, so that one holding a voidable
security interest cannot retain his right in the debtor's property by withholding his
acceptance of a plan that binds unsecured creditors. Cf. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Oliver, 230 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1956), rejecting a reclamation petition filed in a wage
earner proceeding by a nonconsenting chattel mortgagee who had failed to perfect his
security interest. See generally Note, 70 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 (1957).
39. Imposing a burden on the secured creditor to object to the wage earner's
proposal to include him in the plan might be more satisfactory. The court could treat
the creditor's failure to reject the proposal as a waiver of his right to object and an
implied consent to his inclusion in the plan.
40. See Appendix A.
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practice among referees of allowing post-filing claims. 41 Enactment
might tend to discourage the merchant or lender from extending
credit without thoroughly examining his debtor's ability to pay
and would favor creditors who extended credit to the wage earner
at an earlier time on, presumably, a more justifiable basis.
Under proposed section 644, no interest would accrue on unsecured claims after the filing of the Chapter XIII petition.~ Section
642 would provide that, in ascertaining the amount of damages inflicted by the trustee's rejection of an executory contract, the court
must require mitigation of damages by the creditor and take into
account his lost profits, state law to the contrary notwithstanding. 43
Other proposed changes include requiring the wage earner to file
his proposed plan simultaneously with his petition, or at least prior
to the first meeting of the creditors,44 and requiring each creditor to
satisfy the court that his claim is free from usury before being allowed to participate in distributions. 45
II.

THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY COMMITTEE PROPOSAL

The rather conservative, piecemeal nature of the amendments advanced by the National Bankruptcy Conference sharply contrast with
the proposal of the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law. 46 The Committee seeks enactment of legislation that
would require the referee, upon a determination that the petition41. See Gates, My Practice in Chapter XIII Proceedings, 17 REF. J. 95 (1943).
42. See Appendix A. The argument for permitting interest to accrue after confirmation is that some -unsecured creditors have anticipated and provided for trouble.
See Allgood, Wage Earner Petitions Under Chapter XIII, 46 COM. L.J. 17 (1941). But
it seems desirable that bankruptcy courts should jealously guard their advantage over
private debt consolidation plans whereby some creditors can profit by excessive interest
charges for refinancing. The usual rule is that interest does not accrue on unsecured
debts after a bankruptcy court takes over the debtor's assets for administration.
43. See Appendix A.
44. See Appendix A, §§ 623, 624, &: 632. The first meeting will be more useful if
creditors have had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with their rights under the
proposed plan. A proposal to permit the debtor to schedule the payment of debts out
of funds not derived from employment was defeated. Such freedom to plan might give
greater flexibility to the debtor and larger payments sooner to creditors.
45. See Appendix A, § 656(b). The current practice of barring confirmation until
all filing creditors have proved that their claims are nonusurious tends to penalize the
debtor, rather than the lax or usurious creditor; courts withhold relief from the debtor
for his creditor's failure to comply with the plan under which both may benefit. BANK•
RUPTCY GENERAL ORDER No. 55(4) was intended to remedy this situation, but it failed.
The proposed legislation makes some proof of nonusurious rates a prerequisite to each
claim's participation in the plan, which will not be delayed confirmation by a creditor's
reluctance to come forward. Such procedure should alert the courts generally to unfair
credit practices.
46. See Appendix B. A minority within the National Bankruptcy Conference doubts
that it should oppose the proposals of the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee without
further study. See generally NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF TIIE CoMMnTEE on WAGE EARNERS' PLANS (1964).
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ing bankrupt has failed to show that he could not obtain adequate
relief under Chapter XIII, to vacate the adjudication and dismiss
the proceedings in bankruptcy unless the debtor changes his petition
to one for a wage earner's plan.47
Although it would likely increase the proportion of Ohapter XIII
filings in bankruptcy, this proposal goes too far. The court would
have practically unlimited discretion to force a wage earner to pay
outstanding debts from future income.48 Any hope of fostering responsible, voluntary debt-paying would be hampered if wage
earners' plans become involuntary.49 Even if the desirability of developing moral fiber in consumer debtors by encouraging them to
pay their debts is accepted,50 circumstances may arise that justify a
grant of the absolute discharge, such as unemployment, disability,
or unanticipated losses or liabilities. While the committee's proposal
permits a wage earner proving the inadequacy of Chapter XIII relief
to resort to straight bankruptcy, the absence of criteria for "adequate
relief" accords too much administrative discretion to bankruptcy
courts, and bankruptcy courts in certain areas of the country would
be extremely unlikely ever to find Chapter XIII relief inadequate,
even under severe circumstances.
Referees do not now tend to administer wage earners' plans uniformly. 51 The broad discretion implicit in the Committee's proposal
could lead to a further lack of uniformity in administration of Chapter XIII proceedings, thus frustrating one of the basic goals of the
National Bankruptcy Conference's recommendations. 52 Chapter
XIII is employed most frequently in low-income areas as a result of
heavy pressures from the employer, the creditors, referee, and trustee
47. See Appendix B.
48. See generally Snedecor, Chapter XIII-Wage Earners' Plans, 14 REF. J. 33 (1939).
49. See Meth, Ethical and Economic Considerations in Chapter XIII Proceedings,
36 REF. J. 41 (1962). "[T]he program of Chapter XIII •.• arrives at the terms of payment ••• not by ethical analysis but by an ad hoc negotiation between the debtor and
interested creditors. No attempt is made to evaluate the claims of non-usurious creditors so as to aid the needy creditor or the person who, for example, has rendered
services, as against the lender at interest or the retail vendor. Indeed, a strict policy
against preference is adhered to. No attempt is made scientifically to analyze the
debtor's budgeL ••• The program is therefore ethically satisfactory but no more ideal
than the limited imagination and energy of the debtor and his creditors make iL
'\\There, after a term of years only a percentage of indebtedness is liquidated, and
principal and interest charges are unpaid, discharge leaves the debtor in only somewhat better ethical (and emotional) condition than conventional bankruptcy." See
generally Note, 6 U. CHI. L. REv. 459, 462-63 (1939).
50. Cf. Hamilton, In re the Small Debtor, 42 YALE L.J. 473, 481 (1933), stating that
"the man who, even though he is under no legal compulsion, consecrates his life to the
satisfaction of debts improvidently contracted is today a hero in the worlds of fact
and of fiction. In the scheme of values which prevails, contractual obligation is still
too elevated, even in comparison with liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to be dislodged from its strategic place in the law." But see Coulter, The Family as a Unit in
Industrial Sodety, 196 ANNALS 20, 23 (1938).
51. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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on the wage earner to elicit his assent to the plan. In these regions of
the country the proposed change would likely eliminate, as a practical matter, the possibility of an employee's gaining relief of absolute discharge in straight bankruptcy, even when it is the only
feasible alternative.
Proponents of the bill argue that, because wage earners' plans
are not mandatory, there is nothing to preclude one who earns a
high income from obtaining a complete discharge in straight bankruptcy if he is willing to liquidate his assets. Consequently, such an
individual can utilize bankruptcy law to evade his contractual obligations. If a choice must be made, however, it would seem preferable
to allow a few high-income bankrupts to abuse the act than to subject
many low-income wage earners to a form of wage servitude under
the Committee's proposal. In any event, the high-income bankrupt
problem might better be alleviated by incorporating the conditional
discharge into straight bankruptcy proceedings for voluntary, nonbusiness bankrupts. 53 The availability to a voluntary bankrupt of
complete, nearly automatic discharge for all debts is peculiar to
American jurisprudence.54 Both English and Canadian legislation,
for instance, condition discharge in bankruptcy on payment of a
minimum portion of the petitioner's debts. 55 Unconditional discharges could be limited to a bankrupt who can establish that he
contracted his debts in good faith and with a reasonable belief in his
ability to pay; 56 that he will satisfy a predetermined percentage of
provable debts; 57 or that he has obtained the consent of a predetermined percentage of his creditors in number and amount to his
absolute discharge. 58 Due regard should be taken, of course, for
53. See generally MacLachlan, Puritanical Theory for Wage Earners, 68 COM. L.J.
87 (1963). The Hastings-Michener Bill proposed to incorporate the concepts of the
conditional and suspended discharges into the American bankruptcy system, a scheme
leaving wide discretion in the bankruptcy court to fashion a decree granting a discharge that is effective only after a period in which the bankrupt has fulfilled certain
obligations specified by the court. Cf. S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, 101-07
(1932). Considerable opposition to the legislation came from the National Bankruptcy
Conference, which feared that extensive judicial powers would further subjugate the
bankrupt.
54. See generally Salter, Brief Comparison of the United States and British Bankruptcy Acts, 62 CoM. L.J. 358 (1957).
55. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 &: 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 26; CAN. REv. STAT. c. 14, § 129
(1952). See generally Joslin, Bankruptcy Chat From England, 38 REF. J. 22 (1964).
Under Canadian law the court has unlimited discretion to condition the discharge,
regardless of any mitigating factors.
56. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 &: 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 26.
57. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 required consent of two-thirds of the creditors in
number and amount if the debtor does not satisfy 50% of his provable debts. 2 Stat.
19, 31 (1800). The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 required satisfaction of 50% of the provable
debts or consent of a majority in number and amount. 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867).
58. This could be designed along the lines of Bankruptcy Act §§ 651, 652, 52 Stat.
934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 (1958), which provide for confirmation of a plan.
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cyclical economic recessions affecting both businessmen and
consumers.
An alternative might be to permit the court to deny, suspend,
postpone, alter, or condition the discharge of a wage earner who
annually earns an amount of income substantially in excess of his
provable debts. 59 Although standards would have to be developed
by Congress to implement the conditional discharge, 60 the discretion
granted the court need not be so broad as to permit commitment of
the debtor's future earnings indefinitely. Most important, a debtor
with a sizeable income could be forced to recognize a legal obligation to pay his creditors, at least to a greater degree than required
when an absolute discharge is available.

III. THE

ROOTS OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

The foregoing proposals would help ease the symptoms of an
infirm credit economy, but they would not treat the problem at its
source. 61 Perhaps the former is a more proper purpose of bankruptcy
legislation. However, to identify the causes of excessive consumer
bankruptcy, the precipitating factors must be distinguished from
the more basic, underlying ones. Among the precipitating causes are
wage garnishments, 62 deficiency judgments, 63 harsh debt collection
59. See generally McKenzie, Suspended or Conditional Discharges, 19 REF. J. 45
(1945).
60. See Woods, Against Conditional or Limited Discharges, 19 REF. J. 47 (1945).
Opponents of a scheme of conditional discharge point to its impractical aspects, such
as additional administrative expense, the need for extensive judicial supervision, and
the business and credit uncertainty created by the conditions imposed. But see Woodbridge, Wage Earners' Receiverships, 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 242 (1940).
61. "Increased use of Chapter XIII is considered the most important because it
would be the easiest to accomplish and would show results very quickly." MISBACH,
P.ERS0NAL BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH (1964) at 40. "Not until bankruptcy is thought of as a congeries of problems, such as housing, home buying, small
loans, collection methods, unemployment, medical costs, retail credit practices, instalment buying, automobile accidents, etc., rather than as an institution, will more ef•
fective control over these problems and their various agencies eventuate." Douglas,
Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591, 642 (1933).
62. See Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy, 35 REF. J. 37 (1961), who attributes consumer bankruptcies primarily to garnishment or threat of garnishment of
wages in conjunction with a state wage exemption law that is highly favorable to the
creditor. It has been suggested that amortization of debts will be quite successful if the
required payments are less than those that can be obtained by garnishment. See Nadler,
supra note 15. See generally SADD & WILLIAMS, CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCIES AMONG CON·
SUMEllS (1933).
63. "In almost every instance, the loan companies who make loans secured by liens
on household furniture, and the no down payment appliance dealers, will have liens
on property which on liquidation is probably not worth the amount of their lien."
Rice, supra note 25, at 105. The interests of small loan companies, sales finance companies, and installment sellers seem to be mainly in sales or loan volume, not appraisal of credit risks on an individual basis. See Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom,
77 HA11.v. L. REv. 1452, 1458-59 (1964). The lenders' lack of concern over whether the
product sold is sufficient security has led to a proposal to deny deficiency judgments to
creditors that have repossessed personal property. See Snedecor, supra note 62.
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procedures, 64 and allegedly irresponsible practices by a minority of
the legal profession. 65 Often these factors are used as justifications
by some who readily resort to bankruptcy without concern for the
social stigma. 66 Modification of state laws to remove certain pressures on debtors such as wage garnishment would decrease the incidence of consumer bankruptcies somewhat; but for most insolvent
debtors, the precipitating cause of bankruptcy would probably be
merely postponed. Probably the most significant underlying cause of
consumer bankruptcy is the debtor's extravagance, his unrealistic
belief that someday he will have enough money to pay for what he
wants, although marital strife, unemployment, and unforeseen medical expenses also contribute. This undying faith is too often fortified by unjustifiable extensions of credit and credit practices. 67
Perhaps the eternal optimism of the debtor cannot be cured, but
something can be done about the credit practices of the seller.
Instances of unwarranted credit extensions and improper credit
practices are rife. Lenders in some states, shielded by exceptions to
state usury laws, charge their debtors as much as thirty-six per cent
simple interest. 68 Advertising whets the consumer's appetite, and then
high pressure sales tactics and "easy credit" claims or promises of postponed payment lower his sales resistance. 69 Credit investigations
which may reveal one's inability to pay out of future earnings and the
small value of the collateral, if any, are often disregarded. 7°Collusion
between retailers and lenders to maximize sales, dealer "reserves"
for "selling the financing and for selling credit life and liability
insurance to the purchaser," and salesmen's commissions often overshadow the financial well-being of the ultimate individual con64. See Banks, The Forgotten Remedy-Wage Earners' Plans Under the Bankruptcy
Act, 29 REF. J. 125 (1955). Dr. Milton J. Huber, Director of Public Relations of the
Michigan Credit Union League, in an address to the 8th Annual Conference of the
Council on Consumer Information, March 1962, attacked credit grantors that charge
exorbitant interest and resort to garnishment for their security.
65. Linn K. Twinem, The Bankruptcy Problem and What Can Be Done About It,
an address before the National Retail Merchants Association, September 24, 1962.
66. "Taking bankruptcy" has recently become a popularized method of paying old
debts. See Nadler, supra note 15.
67. See Krause, Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 17 Bus. LAw. 772 (1962); Nadler,
Quo Vadis, 0 Ye Insolvent Wage Earner-Nine Out of Ten Bankrupts Are Wage
Earners, 7 N.Y.L.F. 331 (1961).
68. See Countryman, supra note 63. One reason for the discouragement of Chapter
XIII proceedings is the feeling among many attorneys and referees that debtors have
been victimized by sharp credit practices and should not have to pay in full. See
Comment, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 372 (1960).
69. See The Consumer Bankruptcy Question, 31 FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE ~6 ijuly 1963)
noting that "ads inviting recent bankrupts to apply for credit [are] a very common
practice of -used car dealers and loan companies. . . . [S]uch advertisers will have the
debtors at their mercy, and may use collection techniques from which bankruptcy will
not be an escape for six years."
70. See Sturges &: Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptdes,
42 YALE L.J. 487, 514-15 (1933).
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sumer.71 Emphasis on generous time purchasing plans to increase
sales' volume to wholesalers, retailers, and consumers is replacing
competition in the quality of the services and goods sold; 72 and
various deceptive and irresponsible credit schemes have been developed. 73
There is clear need for stricter regulation of lenders in general
and the retail sales installment and small loan businesses in particular. 74 It hardly seems practicable to recommend that states alone
act to regulate the credit practices of these institutions. Remedial
legislation, even if considered, would lack uniformity in application
and effect. 75 Federal "truth-in-lending" legislation, which requires disclosure to the consumer of the true cost of financing a transaction
71. See generally PHELPS, INSTALMENT SALES FINANCING: ITS SERVICES TO THE DEALER
(1953). Frequently lenders will approve financing of marginal credit risks in return for
the opportunity to obtain from the same seller one or more good credit risks.
72. See Krause, Decries Intensified Demand for Extended Credit as Unsound Drag
on Turnover of Receivables, 60 CREDIT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 10 (Sept. 1958).
See generally Credit Administration and Profits, 65 CREDIT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
40 ijan. 1963).
73. For example, the "double-dip," the "balloon note" and the "flip." When a purchaser cannot establish a sufficient down-payment to merit one creditor's financing the
entire balance of the price, a "double-dip" obtains two extensions of credit for the
purchase of the same item, one loan being secured by the chattel purchased, the other
by the debtor's furniture or nothing at all. The "balloon note" is used to induce the
potential purchaser to buy a chattel by offering him a lower schedule of payments for,
say, the first 35 months of a 36-month installment contract; the unpaid portion accumulates in a "balloon" which is payable on the 36th month or which can be refinanced at a more exorbitant rate of interest. The "flip" amounts to a consolidation
of existing installment and non-installment debts for the purpose of spreading the
expense over a longer period; but when an interest-bearing debt is refinanced, the
advantage of more numerous, lower payments is weakened by the additional financing
charges. See generally Kennedy, Debt Pooling Arrangements v. Chapter XIII Proceedings, 32 REF. J. 109 (1958). No comprehensive list of deceptive and irresponsible credit
practices has been compiled. Specific practices with explanatory text are noted in
PLUMMER 8e YOUNG, SALES FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 227-43 (1940).
See generally BLACK, BUY Now, PAY LATER 211-21 (1961): "It is the thesis of this book
that the American consumer who buys on credit is often being abused and deceived
and in some instances outrageously swindled. . . . During the past decade, however,
sellers of credit discovered more profit could be derived from debt itself so that the
sale of merchandise and goods became subordinated to the sale of credit. For the consumer this meant that he was buying something which had no function, no use, no
purpose•••• One cannot avoid the conclusion that a new class-the indigent debtoris emerging in America. This class is made up of people from all walks of life with
a wide variety of incomes who have been overloaded and oversold debts they are unable to pay•••• The most disturbing aspect of debt merchandising is that it is generally based on deception. The deception varies in degree and amount, but it occurs
alm05t every time someone is sold debt. Moreover, what really jars the moral nerve
is that much of this deception is now considered normal behavior by most of the nation's respected and respectable business institutions.••• [W]e can no longer as individuals and people countenance such an atmosphere of deception, sharp practices,
and, on too frequent occasions, unmitigated fraud."
74. See Werson, Public Relations for the Consumer Finance Industry, 33 REF. J.
103 (1959). Cf. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 886 (1964).
75. But see Buerger, The Uniform Law Commissioners' Consumer Credit Project,
19 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 46 (1965); Shay, The Proposed Uniform Consumer
Credit Law, 19 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 9 (1964).
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and disclosure requirements of state small loan and retail installment sales statutes are not likely to correct the existing pattern of
reckless credit extension.76 Perhaps greater federal control over unfair credit practices, posited on the power to regulate interstate commerce, 77 would effect substantially uniform credit practices without
significantly restricting the free market and the flow of commerce.
Such legislation might require federal licensing of retail credit and
small loan businesses, conditioned upon a showing that the company
does not engage in unfair credit practices such as charging exorbitant interest rates, utilizing deceptive financing schemes, and extending credit to a debtor with knowledge of his probable inability to
meet his obligations. If credit extensions to persons patently unable
to pay their debts were prohibited, the result could represent a
positive economic saving.
An alternative to such general federal regulation of credit practices would be a statutory system awarding priority in asset distribution in bankruptcy among creditors on the basis of when credit
was extended and what the debtor's ability to pay appeared to be
when the credit was extended. Such a plan would encourage rational
lending by rewarding the creditor who investigates and decides to
lend on the basis of the individual's ability to pay rather than
favoring the creditor who is most diligent in pursuing judicial
remedies. 78 However, the difficulty of administering a priority system would be prohibitive. Unless a detailed filing system, which
probably would not be used by most creditors, were instituted for
unsecured debts, bankruptcy courts would be inundated by creditors
litigating close questions of fact concerning the reasonableness of
extending credit to the debtor at a particular time.
CONCLUSION

There is no imminent legislative solution to what are probably
the greatest causation problems of consumer bankruptcy: unwar76. See Countryman, supra note 62; Beck, The Douglas Bill-Where Is It Headed?,
17 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REPORT 42 (1963). See generally JOHNSON, METHODS OF
STATING CONSUMER FINANCE CHARGES (1961).
77. The constitutional basis of interstate commerce which would apply to such
legislation has been set forth in Senate hearings on a bill to establish the federal
licensing of corporations. See Hearings on S. 10 and S. 3072 Before the Subcommittee
on Federal Licensing of Corporations of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 1st &: 3d Sess. 1-795 (1937-38). The legislation, ostensibly to license and to
regulate the formation and operations of corporations involved in interstate commerce, was intended to permit greater federal control over state and regional labor
conditions and manufacturing operations and to permit more equitable distribution
of wealth to the ultimate consumer. Cf. Braucher, Federal Enactment of the UCC,
16 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 100 (1951). An alternative basis for such legislation might
be the bankruptcy power. See generally Martin, Substantive Regulation of Security
Devices Under the Bankruptcy Power, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 62 (1948).
78. See Countryman, supra note 63.

June 1965]

Consumer Bankruptcy

1461

ranted credit extensions and unfair credit practices. The National
Bankruptcy Conference's recommendations are significant and, if
enacted, should prove effective in making more uniform the law
and administration of wage earners' plans. The likelihood remains
that the Conference too narrowly restricted its purpose to increasing
the effectiveness of the existing law of consumer bankruptcy, rather
than attempting to attack the remaining underlying causes of bankruptcy. The proposals of the Conference and the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee are not mutually exclusive, but their major purposes conflict. The Consumer Bankruptcy Committee's proposal
granting the courts great discretion to dismiss a petition in straight
bankruptcy unless the bankrupt shows he could not obtain satisfactory relief under a wage earners' plan would increase the disparity
that already exists in the administration of Chapter XIII between
various jurisdictions and could undermine the voluntary nature of
the wage earners' plan.
Support given by credit grantors to legislation which promotes
such untrammelled judicial discretion and which seems to place the
total blame of consumer bankruptcy on the debtors reflects the
credit business community's unwillingness to correct its own abuses.
The fault of the consumer debtor for the prevalence of bankruptcy
cannot be accurately measured until more responsible credit practices by the lenders are observed.79 Federal legislation could be instrumental in promoting credit integrity, lowering the cost of credit,
and, incidentally, restoring consumer integrity. Once responsible
credit practices are enforced, legislators will better be able to determine when and how to apportion financial responsibility to bankrupts. Until then, the task is to perfect existing means of debtor
rehabilitation with enactment of legislation such as the National
Bankruptcy Conference's proposals and to encourage credit grantors
to clean their own houses.
C. William Garratt
APPENDIX A
AMENDMENTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY Acr, CHAPTER XIII PREPARED BY THE
DRAFTING CoMMITfEE AND .APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMllTEE OF THE
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE

SEC. 606. For the purposes of this chapter, unless inconsistent with the context(!) "Claims" shall include all claims of whatever character against the debtor or
his property, whether or not provable as debts under section 63 of this Act and
whether secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, but
shall not include claims secured by [estates] interests in real property or chattels
real, or claims arising after the filing of the petition under this chapter.
SEC. 614. The court may, in addition to the relief provided by section 11 of this
Act and elsewhere under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the
79. Cf. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1497-1502 (1959), suggesting that while some
consumer failures are predictable and may be a necessary incident of consumer ,;redit,
social welfare legislation is not the best means to achieve debtor rehabilitation.
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commencement or continuation of suits in any jurisdiction other than suits to enforce
liens upon the property of a debtor, and may, upon notice and for cause shown,
enjoin or stay until final decree any act or the commencement or continuation of any
proceeding to enforce any lien upon the real or personal property of a debtor. Such
injunction or stay of any proceeding to enforce a lien may be continued after confirmation of the plan only upon condition that the debtor shall, (1) in such manner
and at such time as the court may fix, make all payments on the secured debt which
became due without acceleration before confirmation, and (2) comply with the security
agreement or applicable state law as to payments becoming due thereafter without
acceleration.
SEC. 623. A petition filed under this chapter shall state that the debtor is
insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature and that he desires to effect a
composition or an extension, or both, out of his future earnings or wages. The
petition shall set forth the provisions of or be accompanied by the plan proposed
by him, or shall state that he intends to propose a plan pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter.
SEC. 624. (1) The petition shall be accompanied [-(I)] by a statement of the
executory contracts of the debtor[;] and the schedules and statement of affairs, if
not previously filed, [:Provided, however, That] except that if the debtor files with
a petition a list of his creditors and their addresses and a summary of his assets and
liabilities, the court may, on application by the debtor, grant for cause shown further
time, not exceeding ten days, for filing the statement of the executory contracts and
the schedules and statement of affairs, and such time shall not further be extended
except for cause shown and on such notice and to such persons as the court may
direct [; and].
(2) [where a petition is filed under section 622 of this Act, by payment to the
clerk of $15 to be distributed, $10 to the Treasury of the United States for deposit
in the referees' salary and expense fund and $5 to the clerk, in lieu of the fees of
$32 and $8 as prescribed in sections 40 and 52 of this Act: Provided, however, That
such fees may be paid in installments, if so authorized by General Order of the
Supreme Court of the United States.] If a plan is not set forth in or does not accompany the petition, a plan shall be filed by the debtor within ten days of the filing
of the petition under this chapter, and such time shall not be further extended
except for cause shown and on such notice to such persons as the court may direct.
SEC. 632. (I) Promptly after the filing of the plan [The judge or referee] the
court shall [promptly] call a meeting of creditors [,] upon at least ten days' notice by
mail to the debtor and his creditors.
(2) The notice of such meeting shall be accompanied by a copy of the proposed
plan, and may state the time for the filing of the application to confirm the plan
and the time for the hearing on confirmation including objections thereto.
SEC. 633. At such meeting, or at any adjournment thereof(!) [no change]
(2) [delete in its entirety]
(3) [renumber (2)]
[(4)] (c) the court shall, if the plan is accepted, appoint a [trustee] distributing agent
to receive and distribute, subject to the control of the court, all moneys to be paid
under the plan and shall require such [trustee] distributing agent to give bond with
surety to be approved by the court in such amount as the court shall fix; and
[(5)] (4) the court shall fix a time for the filing of the application to confirm the
[arrangement] plan and for a hearing on the confirmation thereof or any objection to
the confirmation, unless such times have [already] been [named] stated in the notice
of the meeting or unless all creditors affected by the [arrangement] plan have accepted
it.
SEC. 642, [retain entire section, with the exception of the proviso which is to
be deleted, adding the following] The coun shall scrutinize the circumstances of an
assignment of a future rent claim and the amount of the consideration paid for such
assignment in determining the amount of damages allowed the assignee thereof.
Notwithstanding any state law to the contrary, in determining damages resulting
from the Tejection of any executory contract, the court shall Tequire that the
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e1editor mitigate damages, and shall take into account loss of profit as an element of
damages.
SEC. 644. Interest shall not accrue on unsecured claims after the filing of a
petition under section 622 or, if the petition was filed under section 621, after the
date of the filing of the original petition in bankruptcy, unless the proceeding is
dismissed.
SEC. 646. A plan under this chapter-

(2) may include provisions dealing with secured debts severally, upon any terms[;)
but if any secured creditor does not accept, the provisions of the plan dealing with
his rights shall be excluded from the plan and he shall not be affected thereby; •.•
SEC. 652. If a plan has not been so accepted, an application for the confirmation
of the plan may be filed with the court within such time as the court shall have
fixed in the notice of such meeting, or at or after such meeting and after, but not
before(!) it has been accepted in writing, if unsecured creditors are affected by the plan,
by a majority in number of all such creditors whose claims have been proved and
allowed before the conclusion o.f the meeting, which number shall represent a
majority in amount of such claims, and by the secured creditors whose claims are
dealt with by the plan except as provided in subdivision (2) of section 646 of this
Act; and
(2) the debtor has made the deposit of moneys required of him under this chapter
and under the plan.
SEC. 656••••
(b) [Before confirming any such plan the court shall require proof from each
creditor filing a claim that such claim is free from usury as defined by the laws of
the place where the debt was contracted.] No creditor may participate in distributions
under the plan unless he establishes by affidavit or in such other manner as the
court may require that his claim is free from usury as defined by the laws of the place
where the debt was contracted.
SEC. 657. (1) Claims, including those of the United States, a State, or a sub•
division thereof, which are not filed within six months after the first date set for
the first meeting of creditors called pursuant to section 632 of this Act shall not be
allowed to participate in a plan under this chapter. The court may, however, on
application, before the expiration of such period grant further time, not exceeding
six months, for the filing of a claim.
(2) Upon confirmation of a plan, the plan and its provisions shall be binding upon
the debtor and upon all creditors of the debtor, whether or not they are affected by
the plan or have accepted it or have filed their claims, and whether or not their claims
have been scheduled or allowed or are allowable.
SEC. 662. Upon the consummation of a proceeding under this chapter, as provided either in section 660 or section 661 of this Act, the court shall enter a final
decree discharging the [trustee] distributing agent, closing the estate and making
such provision, by way of injunction or otherwise, as may be equitable.

APPENDIX B
88th Congress
2d Session

H.R. 12784

Introduced October 2, 1964
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL to amend the Bankruptcy Act with respect to the use of Chapter XIII.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 55(b) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.
9l(b)) is amended to read as follows:
"b. At the first meeting of creditors, the judge or referee shall preside and,
before proceeding with other business, shall, if the bankrupt is a wage earner
within the meaning of subsection (8) of section 607 of this Act, determine
whether the bankrupt has shown that adequate relief cannot be obtained under
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Chapter XIII of this Act. In the event that the judge or referee shall determine
that the bankrupt has failed to make such a showing, he shall enter an order
vacating the order of adjudication and dismissing the bankruptcy proceedings
with notice to all of the bankrupt's creditors, unless, within such time as the
judge or referee shall fix, the petition be amended to comply with requirements
of Chapter XIII for the filing of a debtor's petition. In the event that the bankrupt
is not a wage earner or shall make such a showing as aforesaid, the judge or
referee may then allow or disallow the claim of creditors there presented, and
shall publicly examine the bankrupt or cause him to be examined, and may
permit creditors to examine him."

